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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN HAMPTON, 
Plaintiff and AppelLant, 
-vs.-
MARION H. ROWLJ<~Y and NORMA 
ROWLEY, his wife, dba ROWLgY 
BUILDERS SUPPLY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9050 
BRlHF OF APPELLAN1' 
PRELIMINARY S'l'ATEMEKT 
Throughout this Brief, plaintiff and appellant will 
be referred to a:> ''Plaintiff" and defendant and respond" 
ent, ~!arion H . .Howley. will be referred to a~ "Defend-
ant." All Italics are ours. 
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S'L'ATEME~'J' OF FACTS 
Defendants are the operators of a lumber yard and 
building materials ,tore at 4350 South 9th East Street, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
On the 29th of March, 1958, which was a Saturday 
at approximately 1:15 P.:M., plaintiff came to the store 
of defendants and found the south portion thereof occu-
pied by the father of defendant, Wilford H. Rowley. 
Plaintiff knocked on the door of the portion of the build-
ing occupied by \Vilford H. Rowley and informed him of 
the need which he had for three bags of cement. Wilford 
II. Rowley inrormcd plaintiff that he could not help him 
get the cement but if he wanted to get three bags of ce.-
ment he could do so. Plaintiff, thereupon, went through 
the south portion of the defendants' establishment and 
obtained a sack of cement. As he came out of the front 
of the building and stepped on the step, his foot hit a 
piece of gravel and plaintiff fell forward off the steps 
onto the apron surrounding the steps and suffered a 
sprain of his right foot and ankle. 
Around the apron which \nt~ made of cement and the 
steps leading- into the south portion of defendants' place 
of busines,;, the defendant. <lW'I' tlw _,·ears, had spread a 
gravel covering. Thi,.; covering had been maintained ami 
raised aH defendants du111pcd additional gravel on the 
an•a ('l'. Sl, 82). Defendant had on the premi,.;e~ hand 
tm<'k~ l'or uo>l' in caiT~·ing henYy materials but plaintiff 
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was not furni:;hed with such a truck to assist him in get-
ting the cement which he purchased out of the defendants' 
place of business (T. 92). After plaintiff had received 
the cement he paid Wilford H. Rowley for the articles 
and left the place of business of defendants. 
The case came on for trial before the Honorable Mer-
rill C. Faux on the 15th day of December, 1958. Plain-
tiff presented his evidence and defendants presented their 
evidence and the Court instructed the Jury. A verdict 
of No Cause of Action was rendered. 
SD-1.\tARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN 




THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTION NO. 11-A, SUB-
pARAGRAPH C. 
After the Jmy had retired, the ~ourt prepared In-
~truction 11-_\ and punmant to a Stipulation of Counsel 
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for both parties gave 11-A to the Jury while they were 
in the Jury room. 
Plaintiff had no objection to the procedure followed 
by the Court but did object to the Instruction 11-A and 
particularly that portion of the instruction which read 
as follows: 
"(a) That defendant knew, or in the exercise 
or reasonable care should have known, the rock 
was on the step." 
In many of the slipping and falling cases where a per-
BOD is a guest, or business visitor, the laws require that 
before negligence can be found on the part of the store 
owner there must be evidence from which the ,Jury could 
find that the owner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care _should have known of the dangerous condition. The 
case at bar is an exception to this rule. Knowledge is not 
required under the facts of this caf'.t>, and it is error to 
require such a finding on the part of a Jury. 
·where the owner of the store has intentionally and 
voluntarily created the dangerous condition no knowledge 
1s necessary. 
1'here is no dispute about the fact that defendants 
hauled in the gravel along the front of their store and 
('J"euted the dangerous situation. GravE'! from the area 
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irrunediately adjacent to the steps on which plaintiff fell 
would, under ordinary use, slop over on to the steps. 
It is submitted that the Jury could find that in the normal 
ordinary use of the gravel-covered area and the steps 
that pieces of gravel would be deposited on the steps 
and create and constitute a dangerous condition. 
Plaintiff submits that the present case is within the 
principle which this Court announced in De Weese v. 
J. C. Penney Company, 5 U.2d 116, 297 P.2d 898. The 
Court's opinion written by ,Justice Crockett contains the 
following pertinent statement of the general principle 
wlrich plaintiif submito is applicable: 
"(3) This case differs from those involving 
a foreign substance such as spilled oil or grease, 
or where a pool of water is allowed to accumulate, 
creating a hazardous condition which, under most 
circumstances, is easily observable to the business 
invitee as the store ov..-ner. The terrazzo surfae-
ing is part of the permanent structure of the build-
ing. While it is true that the construction and 
maintenance of the entranceway of terrazzo on an 
inclined plane does not of itself constitute negli-
gence, it comes v.-ithin the rule thai a negligent act 
may be one which 'creates a situation which in-
volves an unrea.\'onable risk to another because of 
the expectable action of the other, a third person, 
an animal or a force of nature.'" 
ln the DeW ~;e,;e case we are concerned, of course, 
with water being Jeposited on a terrazzo :;urflli'e and 
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having it thereby rendered slick and sli-ppery. As the 
Court indicates, a similar situation would exist if the 
deposit causing the surface to be dangerous came on the 
premises as a result of a third person's activity, so. long 
as such activity might be reasonably anticipated. 
A case, perhaps more closely analagous to the pres" 
ent case on its facts than the DeWeese case is Falconer 
vs. Safeway Stores, Inc., 49 \V. 2d 478, 303 P.2d 294 
·which involved the Safeway Stores, Inc., removing its 
garbage in cans. There, the facts indicate that the 
plaintiff was injured within a very few moments of the 
time that the suet on which she slipped was actually 
placed on the sidewalk. The defendants contend that 
unless they had notice of the dangerous condition of the 
premises they would not be liable. The Washington Su-
preme Court, in distinguishing the notice cases from 
the case at bar stated as follows: 
"*._., The notice i10 for the purpose of showing 
that the occupant was aware of the condition of 
the premise~;;, which was created by others, and 
negligently permitted it to continue thereafter. 
The rule requiring SV!Ch notice is not applicable 
where the danger01!S Qondition o_t the pre·mises was 
created in_ the first instance by the occupant. 
The neqli(Jrucr in the instant cac<l:' consists of 
rrrafi11_1; a· da119<'1ous conditiou, not in permitting 
it to ("Ulltinue. One is prc~umed to know what one 
does." 
lnstrud.ion Ko. 11 pla<.•e,; the present case Wlth the 
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eases where the dangerous condition is not created by 
the voluntary and intentional acts of the defendant, and 
as a consequence, the Jury would be required to find 
against plaintiff unless plaintiff showed by a preponder-
ance of evidence that defendants knew that the rock on 
which he stepped was on its front step. Plaintiff respect-
fully submit8 that this was prejudicial error on the part 
of the Court and that as a consequence this Court should 
reverse the Trial court and grant to the plaintiff a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should 
reverse the trial court and order a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KINU AND HUGHES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
2121 So. State Street 
Salt .Lake City, Lftah 
No. 205 Sentinel Building 
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